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agrarian sovietization as well as the unique
value of this study in an admirable manner.
CARL G. ANTHON 
Executive Secretary
Fulbright Commission for the
German Federal Republic
Bad Godesberg, Germany
KONSTANTYN KONONENKO. Ukraine and
Russia: A History of the Economic Re-
lations Between Ukraine and Russia
(1654-1917). (Marquette Slavic Studies,
IV.) Pp. xvi, 257. Milwaukee: Mar-
quette University Press, 1958. $6.50
paperbound; $7.50 clothbound.
The problem posed in this study is this:
with respect to soil, climate, precipitation,
and mineral resources, the Ukraine is one
of the richest and most diversified regions
in Europe; it is strategically located with
respect to Central Europe, the Middle East,
and the Caucasus, and has access to the
ice-free waters of the Black and Oziv Seas;
yet neither agricultural nor industrial de-
velopment of the region has matched that
attained by less favored areas. Why?
Kononenko asserts that the Ukraine was
already at a relatively high stage of com-
mercial development when it came under
Russian sovereignty, but that it was never
unified economically with Russia; instead,
&dquo;... Russian economic policy always aimed
at differentiating Ukraine from Russia, and
of keeping Ukraine in the status of a
colony&dquo; (p. 32).
Although the analysis is limited to the
period from the abolition of serfdom,
which took place in 1861, to 1917, one
chapter of thirty-two pages is,,devoted to
developments from 1648 to 1861. Major
attention is given to agrarian developments
from 1861 to 1917 (67 pp.), to industrial
developments, with detailed examination of
the sugar, coal and metallurgical industries
(56 pp.); and to conditions in banking and
&dquo;finance capital&dquo; (37 pp.).
In his analysis, Kononenko uses official
government statistics, state papers, letters
of government officials, and numerous
studies made by Russian scholars. His
conclusion is clear cut: from the beginning,
&dquo;The aim of Russian policy was not merely
to shield their industry and commerce from
dangerous Ukrainian competition but also
:he transformation of Ukraine into a source
)f raw material and a market absorbing
:heir production&dquo; (p. 108).
A variety of tools was used to accom-
plish these goals. Railroads were located
to serve industries in Moscow and Peters-
burg, and the freight rates imposed were
discriminatory both as to commodities and
direction of traffic; a tax system was con-
structed which not only channeled revenues
into Russia without corresponding expendi-
tures in the Ukraine but which also raised
prices of Ukrainian products to the point
of discouraging domestic consumption, thus
forcing the goods into export trade which
helped provide a favorable balance of trade.
In other cases, export of Ukrainian raw
materials was prohibited in order to chan-
nel them, at low prices, into Russian fac-
tories. At one time, we are told, erection
of certain factories was prohibited by law,
and some Ukrainian plants were dismantled
and rebuilt in Russia. Extensive use was
made of customs duties, both internal and
foreign, always to the disadvantage, we are
told, of Ukrainian interests.
Developments in the field of banking and
foreign investments were both more com-
plex and more subtle; but the end result
was the same: the earnings and capital
accumulation arising from such Ukranian
industry as was permitted were channeled
out of the Ukraine into the hands of Rus-
sian capitalists or the imperial treasury.
At times the economic reasoning is diffi-
cult to follow. It is especially difficult to
believe that all phases of economic relation-
ships between the two regions were so care-
fully planned and so successfully adminis-
tered as to work always to the disadvantage
of this particular territory.
The numerous tables throughout the
study usually carry no headings; actual
contents must be discovered from the text
itself. A Bibliography of six pages is ap-
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The &dquo;myth&dquo; which this book seeks to
explode is that the Roman Empire in the
West fell because of internal weaknesses
which made its fall &dquo;inevitable,&dquo; rather than
because of external attacks. As an intro-
duction to his argument, the author has
given a masterly survey of the rise of the
Roman Empire, its salient characteristics
at the time of its height in the second
Christian century, and the various calami-
ties which befell it in the third century.
He then devotes several chapters to the
fourth century, discussing the recovery
initiated by Diocletian, the economic and
social problems and how they were met,
cultural conditions, and the significance of
the transition from paganism to Chris-
tianity. He concludes with an account of
the &dquo;fall&dquo; in the fifth century and a short
chapter on the changing culture of the
epoch.
This is a very scholarly work that is a
pleasure to read. With most of it the re-
viewer is in full agreement. Where he
differs is in the emphasis to be placed
on certain phenomena of the fourth cen-
tury. For the author, the Empire at this
time was politically stable, administratively
reasonably efficient, economically reason-
ably sound, culturally creative, and mili-
tarily competent. For the reviewer, this
is too favorable an appraisal. Granted
that the attacks of the barbarians in the
fifth century were needed to topple the
imperial structure in the West, we must
still ask, with Aymard, why a state of its
size, population, and resources could not
ward off peoples vastly inferior in numbers,
wealth, and culture, and possessed of no
superior weapons or military skill.
The only answer can be internal weak-
ness-the inability to muster resources
effectively for defense. Symptomatic of
this weakness were the Empire’s military
dependence upon barbarians, the lack of
the will to resist among its civilian popula-
tion, civil war and rebellion, treachery in
high places, and above all the inability to
assimilate the barbarians recruited for its
service or settled within its borders. Ay-
mard seems to be right in holding that the
recovery begun in 284 lost its momentum
by the mid-fourth century after which
stagnation and some deterioration set in.
As E. Stein pointed out, the disaster at
Adrianople marks &dquo;the beginning of the
end&dquo; of the Roman Empire as the Medi-
terranean world empire. Christianity con-
tributed little to the fall in the West, but
there it failed to provide the basis of
loyalty which it later gave to the Byzantine
Empire. Nor can we ignore the fateful
division of the Empire in 395, and the
hostility of the East to the West. As for
the East, it barely escaped a like fate. The
break-up of the Hun Empire, a sounder
economy, a stronger population, more as-
tute military policy, and more effective
diplomacy were the main factors in its
survival.
A. E. R. BOAK
Professor of History, Emeritus
University of Michigan
RICHARD HERR. The Eighteenth-Century
Revolution in Spain. Pp. xii, 484.
Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1958. $7.50.
In this significant study Professor Herr
establishes the validity of his central thesis
-that &dquo;on the fundamental questions of
the form of government and religion there
was no cleavage of any depth in Spain
before the outbreak of the French Revolu-
tion,&dquo; and that &dquo;the French Revolution ...
provided the irritants that transformed into
cancerous growths the hitherto innocuous
discords brought on by the Enlightenment
and economic expansion.&dquo;
The pursuit of the complex events behind
his analysis led the author into thorough
examination of secondary works and wide
use of primary sources. The narrative is
divided into two parts, entitled The En-
lightenment and The Revolution, and
ranges through such chapters as &dquo;Land
Boom and Land Hunger,&dquo; &dquo;French Propa-
ganda Campaigns,&dquo; &dquo;Godoy and the Re-
vival of Enlightenment,&dquo; and the-renewed
-&dquo;Jansenist Offensive.&dquo;
The most useful and original part of the
book deals with the impact on Spain of
the events which occurred between 1792
and 1802-the execution of the French
monarch, war and peace with France, and
war with England. Here the author con-
tributes to the knowledge of many aspects
of Spanish history; yet it is precisely here
